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ABSTRACT 
Smartphones are becoming   a dominant form of mobile computing in the world. The Smartphone, as a platform, blends a 
traditional general computing platform with a specialized mobile phone platform. The general computing tradition is 
historically open, allowing its owners to install whatever software they choose and to add or remove hardware as they 
please. Also they are a vault for large amount of personal information about banking, social network, and inter-personal 
communication. These capabilities and information value make it an attractive target to internet miscreants.  
This paper presents a survey on recent researches in Smartphone honeypot. Physical and virtual honeypots have been 
studied in details; however, there is only little work in the field of mobile related honeypot. The survey presents the 
challenges while setting up a smartphone honeypot, and summarizes the researches published in this area. We clarify the 
methods used to build their honeypot, and the results they obtained and their recommendations. 
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INTRODUCTION  
The primary goal of computer security is to defend computers against attacks launched by malicious users. There are a 
number of ways in which researchers and developers can work to protect the software that they write. Some are proactive, 
like code reviews and regression testing, while others are reactive, like the pwn2own contest where new vulnerabilities are 
used to exploit browsers. Some tools can take on aspects of both; one class of these tools is honeypot. 
A honeypot is a computer which has been configured to some extent to seem normal to an attacker, but actually logs and 
observes what the attacker does. Thanks to these modifications, accurate information about various types of attacks can 
be recorded. The term honeypot was first presented by Lance Spitzner in 1999 in a paper titled To Build a Honeypot [1]. 
Honeypot as a term inspired by actual real-life honeypots. Since such represents a pot contains something desirable (the 
honey) to someone (a child or a nest of ants, for example), it could be used to lure them out and then observe them. The 
same is true for a computer honeypot: a tempting target is presented to an attacker, who then comes out and performs his 
attacks. 
Honeypots are deliberately designed to be attack targets, mainly to learn about cyber-attacks and attacker behavior. When 
implemented as part of a security posture, honeypots also protect real networks by acting as a decoy, deliberately 
confusing potential attackers as to the real data. 
Honeypots have been created in many different flavors. From single computer to whole networks of fake machines, called 
honeynets. 
Types of Honeypots 
There are several possible ways to classify honeypots. Some of the more popular are by the level of interaction available 
to the attacker, the type of data collected, and the type of system configuration [2, 3]. 
Level of interaction is the common type of classification; it is based on the level of interaction which is provided to the 
malicious user by the honeypot. The more interactive an environment presented, the closer the honeypot becomes to the 
actual targets of attack, and then potentially more accurate information can be gathered. 
 There are two levels: high-interaction and low-interaction. 
1. High-interaction honeypots let the hacker interact with the system as they would any regular operating system, 
with the goal of capturing the maximum amount of information on the attacker's techniques. Any command or 
application an end-user would expect to be installed is available and generally, there is little to no restriction 
placed on what the hacker can do once he/she comprises the system. 
2. Low-interaction honeypots present the hacker emulated services with a limited subset of the functionality they 
would expect from a server, with the intent of detecting sources of unauthorized activity [4]. For example, the 
HTTP service on a low-interaction honeypot would only support the commands needed to identify that a known 
exploit is being attempted systems. 
Mobile Honeypot 
To cope with the recent changes in the Internet, such as the advent of new popular applications, wide adoption of wireless 
network devices, introduction of high-speed subscriber link technologies to every household, diversity in users' 
demography in terms of culture and legal systems, and smart phones becoming as powerful as laptops and desktops, new 
types of honeypots have been proposed and introduced. 
The term mobile honeypot can be used to describe prefixes of dark net address space that change a periodically, moving 
the dark net in the address space [5].  Here it is referring to honeypot that focus on attacks on mobile devices.  
Multiple challenges while setting up a smart phone honeypot [6], they can be summarized as: 
1. System Setup: How to build an actually smart phone honeypot system. From real devices to development 
emulators and maybe complete simulation. This largely depends on the OS we want to run as a honeypot and on 
the communication types we want to support. Compared to regular computers we have additional hardware and 
software capabilities that need to be present or simulated. 
2. Monitoring: Monitoring the honeypot is one of the essential parts. The honeypot is only useful if we can exactly 
determine what the attacker is doing. Depending on the system setup monitoring can be highly complicated. 
3. Containment: After compromise of the honeypot we need to make sure that the attacker cannot use the honeypot 
for carrying out attacks. 
4. Visibility: To make the honeypot useful it needs to be visible for attackers. This can happen in many ways such 
as publishing the phone number, email address, instant messaging account name and a like in as many ways a 
possible. The honeypot then needs to inspect message content and such to e.g. open links contained in them in 
order to get infected. 
5.  
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EVOLUTION OF MOBILE HONEYPOT: 
There is only little work related to mobile honeypot [7], this is due to the limited hardware resources of the mobile devices 
and their software vulnerabilities.  
The fundamental limitation in the Smartphone platform security is discusses by Husted et al.[8], they discusses the 
conflicting traditions between the cellular, which is restricted and very tightly controlled, and the general computing 
tradition, which is historically open; allowing its owner, i.e., users and administrators, to install whatever software they 
choose, and to add or remove hardware as they please. These two competing ideals clash on the Smartphone platform 
and this is exemplified by Android operating system platform created by Google. Following are several attempts in 
designing a mobile honeypots and the drawback in each design. 
Freeman et al. (December 2009) discusses an experimental method for creating a 1st generation Smartphone honeypot, 
Smartpot, with the intention of discovering automated worms. They use Honeyd low-interaction virtual honeypot to 
discovering automated Smartphone worms by emulating the operating system Windows Mobile 5 and Windows Mobile 6, 
along with the available TCP/UDP ports of each operating system. A significant obstacle was discovered during the 
implementation of the Honeyd Smartphone honeypot, but designing a honeypot to specifically discover knowledge of the 
existence of automated worms is a possible concept. And the methodology of discovering available ports on actual 
Windows Mobile 5 and Windows Mobile 6 Smartphone devices using Nmap network scanner and then emulating those 
ports in a Honeyd honeypot seems viable [9]. 
Mulliner et al. (May 2011) propose HoneyDroid Smartphone honeypot using real mobile phone hardware rather than using 
the Android emulator. This honeypot designed to catch attacks originating from the Internet, mobile network as well as 
through malicious applications. 
With HoneyDroid all relevant devices are virtualized, so Andrioid s not allowed to access hardware directly. This will put all 
of Android's hardware interaction under control, which can then be monitored and containment, which are not provided 
when using emulator approach. 
The most drawbacks are that HoneyDroid does not behave exactly the same way the original Android system does. This 
might be detected by malware, which could then stop its attack and thus escape the honeypot [6].  
Wahlisch et al. (August 2012) Design a low interaction server honeypot based on the standard tools Honeytrap and 
Dionaea in order to get statistical analysis of attacks. 
The honeypot used to present a comparative study that analyzes to what extent those attacks depend on the network 
access. 
They build the subsequent analysis of monitoring attacks on a Linux-based system that is connected to a mobile operator 
network. Their findings indicate that a few topological domains of the Internet have started to place particular focus on 
attacking mobile networks. A mobile device on average suffers from the same amount of attacks as a home network 
device [10]. 
Wahlisch et al. (August 2012) present a digital immune system, SKIMS, for Smartphone. This framework tries to protect 
the mobile device on its own. In cases insufficient, cooperation between neighbors is established. 
The SKIMS system consists of multiple components that used to proactive and reactive defense of attacks; one of these 
components is a low interaction mobile honeypot. This honeypot is designed to collect malicious connection, it emulate 
(FTP, POP3, etc.) network services [11]. 
Yubo et al. (November 2012) propose a honeypot monitoring system for mobile communication by applying the idea of 
active honeypot combined with communication protection. They simulate the wireless access environment and capture the 
mobile phones, as well as analyze and monitor their communication behaviors. And they test the feasibility and efficiency 
of the system by testing an Android smart phone infected with a malware that can embezzle the phone’s address book. 
They conclude that most ant viruses' solutions have big drawbacks [12]: 
1. Antivirus software on the mobile terminal based on hardware devices, leading to: 
a. poor versatility 
b. large resource utilization 
c. Low virus capture rate. 
2. Core network establishment suffers from difficult layout and high cost. 
3. Solution based on base station is limited by the low flexibility and poor portability. 
With honeypot monitoring system all these difficulties are overcome. 
The most obvious defect in their honeypot is the limited supporting range of communication behavior. Some virus samples 
require Internet connection, but their honeypot cannot support GPRS, so many viruses can’t work 
Wahlisch et al. (January 2013) Design a measurement system that capture traffic characteristics of malicious behavior on 
mobile devices and allows for comparison with non-mobile environments. The designed honeypot operate on standard PC 
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running Linux and connected to a mobile network this enables the analysis of malicious traffic across different network 
environments and bears the advantage of simplified long-term maintenance as the same tool basis can be re-used. Three 
sub honeypots are used to implement the designed honeypot, Kippo, Glastopf, and Dionaea. They deployed their 
honeypot on probes connected to a mobile network, as well as monitoring nodes connected to different types of wired 
Internet access and they did not find a relevant ratio of remote attacks that specifically target on the mobile system, neither 
from non-mobile nor mobile networks. And they conclude that mobile devices are currently more threatened with malicious 
applications (e.g., Trojan horse) compared to external, unsolicited requests via the Internet [7]. 
Liebergetd et al. (May 2013) Discusses that recently, attacks against smartphones have shifted towards local 
communication interfaces, which make the traditional honeypot concepts unsuitable. They propose a novel concept called 
nomadic honeypot that provides an infrastructure to enable mobile network operators to collect threat intelligence on 
smartphones. The nomadic honeypot requires that the smartphone is logically divided into two isolated partitions. The 
main partition hosts the mobile OS, but has no direct access to the device’s communication hardware. The second 
partition hosts the infrastructure for our nomadic honeypot. 
They implement their nomadic honeypot to run on the Galaxy S2 smartphone. And they choose Android as the mobile OS 
because of his openness characteristics, which can be virtualized on nonvirtualizable CPUs. The implementation proved 
to be very difficult because all drivers need to be modified to be interposed. 
The nomadic honeypot has inherent usability drawbacks: It has some computational overhead, which means the devices 
will not be as fast as they could be and that the battery will not last as long [13]. 
Gelenbe et al.( July 2013) Design NEMESYS honeypot to collect and analyze information about the nature of cyber-
attacks targeting the mobile devices and the core network so that the counter-measures can be taken. They identify a 
number of open with respect to the general problem of cyber threats against smartphone, and accordingly they design 
NEMESYS project. 
They develop a data collecting, virtualization and analysis infrastructure, and the introduction of novel attack attribution 
and visual analytics technologies for the mining, presentation and representation of large amounts of heterogeneous data 
that are related to the smart mobile ecosystem in order to address these open issues [14]. 
CONCLUSION  
This paper summarizes a survey on the current trends in mobile honeypot researches. From the number of published 
research in this field we can conclude that it is a very new research area. We also recognize that building an accepted 
mobile honeypot is a big challenge. Most attempts have encountered difficulties because of the mobile limited hardware 
resources and the complexity of the programs required to achieve the honeypot's function. Some of the researchers use a 
Smartphone only to implement their honeypot. Others are send the collected events to a PC connected to a mobile 
network for analysis, and another builds their honeypot on a PC connected to a mobile network. When all honeypot 
functions, or part of these functions, are built on a mobile device then the honeypot must be a low interaction honeypot. 
But if the honeypot implemented on a PC (which is recommended) then the honeypot can be designed as: a highly 
interaction honeypot.  
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